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Abstract
In a recent paper [1], we performed a variety of analyses upon user traces collected in the Boston
University Computer Science department in 1995 and 1998. A sanitized version of the 1995 trace
has been publicly available for some time; the 1998 trace has now been sanitized, and is available
from:
 http://www.cs.bu.edu/techreports/1999-011-usertrace-98.gz
 ftp://ftp.cs.bu.edu/techreports/1999-011-usertrace-98.gz
This memo discusses the format of the released version of the log, and includes additional
discussion of how the data was collected, how the log was sanitized, what this log is and is not
useful for, and areas of future research interest.

This work was partially supported by NSF research grants CCR-9706685 and CCR-9501822, and by Microsoft
Research and Hewlett-Packard Laboratories.
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1 Data Collection
The trace was collected in the Boston University Computer Science Department's undergraduate
workstation lab. The lab consists of a cluster of 37 Sun SPARCstation 2's running Solaris. Traces
were collected from April 4, 1998 through May 22, 1998, and included 306 unique users. Students
were given the option to \opt out" of the study (without so much as their decision to do so being
logged), so the trace is probably not exhaustive.
The trace was collected using lightweight non-caching HTTP/1.1 proxy servers running on each
workstation. The proxies logged all requests on a shared NFS lesystem. We discuss the diÆculties
of data collection using a proxy server in section 3.3 of [1]. It is recommended that researchers
familiarize themselves with all of section 3 of that paper before trying to derive any conclusions
from these traces.
2 Log Format
The trace is stored as a single gzipped text le. Each transaction in the trace is stored as a single
line of text (CR-terminated). Fields (\columns" of data) are each separated by a single space. No
eld contains any white space (spaces or tabs). Timestamps are presented as decimal xed-precision
oating point numbers, expressing seconds and microseconds since the UNIX epoch
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.
 Request : Method (GET, HEAD, POST...)
 Request : Host: eld (DNS name of server, hashed)
 Request : URL (in absolute-URI format, hashed)
 Request : Referer (in absolute-URI format, hashed)
 Connection : Client IP address (hashed)
 Connection : Server IP address (hashed)
 Connection : Server Port number (usually 80)
 Request : User name (hashed)
 Response : Status code (200, 304, etc; see below)
 Response : Response content-length (in bytes; see below)
 Timestamp : Proxy started sending request to server
 Timestamp : Proxy started receiving response from server
 Timestamp : Proxy nished receiving response from server
This is almost all of the information that was present in the basic trace from which [1] was
derived. Three types of information have been completely removed: First, we removed several
additional timestamps that were used to examine the performance of the data-collecting proxy and
do some simple latency-related calculations that were not included in the paper. Proper use of
those timstamps would require knowledge regarding the internal architecture of the proxy. Second,
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additional IP address and port information that could be used to identify persistent connections
and provide additional key information had we decided to use a central rather than a distributed
proxy. This information is not needed to identify individual client machines from the provided data
set. Third, elds that were invariant across the whole trace. There were two such elds:
 Client HTTP Version : HTTP/1.0
 User-Agent : Mozilla/4.04 [en] (X11; I; SunOS 5.4 sun4c)
3 Discussion
3.1 Anonymizing
Fields marked as \hashed" have been anonymized using a one-way hash function. Specically, we
have stored:
value
hashed
= checksum
MD5
(concatenate(value
original
; nonce))
Where \nonce" is a binary string of non-trivial length. A single nonce value was selected
randomly (such that each is \unguessable") for each \column" of the dataset; this preserves the
ability to compare members of a column for equality without leaking information regarding equality
across columns. (There is one exception: the URI and Referer elds are hashed using the same
nonce, allowing you to identify referring documents.) The nonces were generated using Linux's
/dev/random device (which uses hardware interrupts and other sources of noise to populate an
entropy pool), were never stored on disk (or even swap; the anonymizer was locked into main
memory using mlockall()), were never displayed or recorded, and were immediately discarded
upon completion of the anonymization.
3.1.1 Limitations
Since (for obvious reasons) the URLs are only available in this hashed form, you will be unable to:
 Look for URL sub-strings (f.e., \cgi-bin" or \.jpg").
 Separate URLs from query-strings (\http://resource?query")
 Infer anything regarding length or depth of the URI or its components, hostname and abs path
 Infer two URLs have equivalent paths but diering hostnames (f.e. \http://www.cs.bu.edu/X"
and \http://www-cs.bu.edu/X")
Anonymization techniques which preserve at least some of these and other interesting properties
are being examined; we hope traces released in the future and re-releases of this trace will be
processed with such techniques.
3.2 Methodology, Caveats, Exceptions, and other tidbits
Presented in no particular order.
Proxy Logs vs Client Logs Since this log ONLY captures network accesses made by the client,
views of documents which were \served" directly out of the browser's cache without revalidation
do not appear in this trace.
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Timestamps Workstation clocks are not tightly synchronized with each other, or with any exter-
nal time source. They are generally within a few seconds of each other, but this is not uniformly the
case. In other words, timestamps only provide a total ordering of requests on a single workstation,
not a global total ordering.
Periodicity A fourier analysis of the amount of traÆc (requests and bytes) will show strong daily
and weekly components. This can be explained by the lab's hours of operation. Note that the lab
being \closed" does not uniformly cause activity to go to zero; terminal assistants and others in
our department have o-hours access rights. Further informal examination shows variability across
multiple time-scales, which is a property of statistically self-similar traÆc [2], although no attempt
was made to validate this nding or estimate the degree of self-similarity.
Conditional Requests Browser cache validations appear in the trace; successful validations are
indicated by a response-code of 304 (not modied), but unsuccessful validations are indistinguish-
able from compulsory cache misses.
Cache-Control Pragma and Cache-Control headers can skew popularity proles of resources by
forcing them to be re-validated (and thus seen by the proxy) at a rate much higher than cachable
documents whith the user views with the same frequency. Cache-control headers were not stored
in the logs.
Request Parallelism The workstation proxies were running with 10 service threads; this put an
upper bound on the number of requests that each proxy could handle in parallel. Take note that
the proxy multiplexed requests and not connections to the threads, so a higher number of parallel
connections was possible.
Proxy Auto-Conguration Using the PAC option aorded us a tremendous amount of exi-
bility in deploying the proxy; for example, should we develop Mozilla 5.0 or IE5.0 logging modules,
we could selectively direct those clients to ignore the proxy, while telling older non-logging clients to
use it. (Environments with multiple installed versions of Netscape are not uncommon in academic
computer labs.)
No Referring Document Specied Some requests are sent with no value in the \Referer"
(sic) eld. These were noted in the logs with a Referer value of \(no-referer)". The rst hashed
\Referer" value in the published trace corresponds with this value.
Failed ident lookups The RFC1413 ident service does not produce correct results under cer-
tain corner cases (for example, premature closes of the client connection). Such cases are stored
with a username of \(nousername)". The eighth hashed username value in the published trace
corresponds with this value.
User Sessions We have no direct way of distinguishing the end of a user session from a long
think-time. Since the workstations were all set up to only allow a single logged-in user at a time,
one simple and eective heuristic is to examine the streams for each individual workstation, and
mark a \new session" whenever the username eld changes. (If you take this approach, be mindful
of the \(nousername)" issue mentioned above.)
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Aborted Connections Some cases of early client aborts were detected by the proxy, and are
indicated by the response status code being stored as a negative number. The abort detection
code used was fairly primitive, and should be regarded as an underestimate. It is not believed that
any \false aborts" are recorded in the log, although \fault aborts" may be present as a result of
poorly-formatted responses from inbound servers. (Sadly, there is an abundance of broken HTTP
applications [3], and there is no canonical list of work-arounds employed by browsers, so the proxy
may have given up on non-compliant responses that Netscape could have handled.)
Content Lengths Some responses did not specify the response content-length. These response
are recorded as having a content-length of -1. Some of these are \proper" cases, like 304 responses
(which by denition carry no entity); others are cases where the server is relying on either a
\chunked" send to the proxy, or is closing the connection to indicate the end of the stream of
content. Current versions of the proxy collect content-length information in these cases as well, but
the code was not in place to do so when this trace was collected.
Proxy Software The proxy software used to collect the data is called \REFLEX", and is being
developed primarily by the author of this paper. REFLEX is designed as a general HTTP server
architecture, and the non-caching proxy functionality is implemented as a service module. It is
currently being extended to act as a HTTP/1.1 (RFC2616) compliant caching proxy and to collect
more extensive data for additional study
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. It will eventually be released under the GNU GPL.
4 Future Directions
We intend to conduct another round of data collection. We have devised techniques for collecting
more extensive information about user browsing patterns, and intend to collect a richer set of
metadata as well (including information about request parameters, document properties, content
negotiaion, explicit cachability controls, cookies, and other items of interest). Some research topics
of particular interest include:
 Real-world Cachability: Matching URIs provides a very optimistic upper bound on cache
hit rates, byte hit rates, and cache miss costs. Real HTTP/1.1 caches have to worry about
document lifetimes, content negotiation, scoping (shared vs. non-shared caches), explicit
cachability controls, validation costs, and the bigger problem that servers may not provide
the cache with enough information to behave correctly (for example, some caches assume that
resonses to requests bearing cookies are uncachable because some sites fail to specify \Vary:
Cookie" or set any explicit cache controls in responses that customize content based upon
cookie values).
 Explaining Zipf-like Popularity Distribution: While many traces show Zipf-like popularity
distributions of names across time, this may be inuenced not only by general popularity
skew but also by document introduction/removal, rate of change, and other properties. We
intend to study revision popularity and its correlation with name popularity, as well as long-
term variations in the content of short-window popularity proles.
 Search Utilities: Proxies have the potential to provide valuable information if they are engi-
neered to collaborate with non-interactive or oine-processing web applications like robot-
s/crawlers, indexes/archives, and search engines.
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We hope to begin a new round of data collection experiments late this fall
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